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Note
Disrupting the Pickering Balance: First
Amendment Protections for Teachers in the
Digital Age
Emily McNee*
In August 2011, Jerry Buell, a Florida public school teacher, made headlines when he was investigated for posting anti1
gay comments on his Facebook page. Buell is one of many
teachers who end up in the press because the school he worked
2
at sought to intrude on his private life. Buell wrote on his Facebook page that he “almost threw up” when he saw the news

* J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2010,
St. Olaf College. Thank you to Professor Stephen Befort, for serving as my advisor for this Note and for comments on an earlier draft. Copyright © 2013 by
Emily McNee.
1. Veteran Teacher Suspended over Facebook Post: Anti-Gay Comments
Spark Outrage, SUN SENTINEL, Aug. 18, 2011, at 6B, available at 2011 WLNR
16450258.
2. See 1st-Grade Teacher Suspended for ‘Derogatory’ Facebook Posts
About Her Students, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 1, 2011, 3:22 PM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/02/1st-grade-teacher-suspended-facebook-posts_n
_843982.html (discussing teacher who was suspended after parents complained that she posted comments about her students on her Facebook page);
J. David McSwane, Facebook Comment Could Cost Manatee County Teacher
Her Job, HERALD-TRIB. (July 4, 2012, 5:32 PM), http://www.heraldtribune
.com/article/20120704/article/120709831 (discussing teacher who could lose
her teaching license because of a Facebook comment that her students “may
be the evolutionary link between orangutans and humans”); Erin Moriarty,
Did the Internet Kill Privacy?, CBS NEWS (Feb. 6, 2011, 7:21 PM), http://www
.cbsnews.com/2100-3445_162-7323148.html (discussing a teacher who resigned after a parent complained to the principal that the teacher had a photo
of a glass of wine and a mug of beer on her Facebook page); Teacher Placed on
Leave for Questionable Facebook Posting, WKOW NEWS (Feb. 3, 2009, 3:36
PM), http://www.wkow.com/Global/story.asp?S=9781795&nav=menu1362_10
(discussing teacher placed on administrative leave after school discovered a
photo of the teacher with a gun on her Facebook page); Kayla Webley, How
One Teacher’s Angry Blog Sparked a Viral Classroom Debate, TIME (Feb. 18,
2011), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2052123,00.html (discussing Natalie Munroe, a teacher who was fired for blogging about her students).
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3

about New York’s decision to allow same-sex marriage. Buell
was suspended and investigated by the school district, but has
4
since been reinstated and has returned to teaching. During
October 2011, Viki Knox, a New Jersey special education
teacher, was investigated by her school for making anti-gay
5
comments that she posted on her Facebook page. Knox’s post
criticized a lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) his6
tory month display at the school where she works. In her post,
Knox referred to homosexuality as a “perverted spirit that has
7
existed from the beginning of creation,” a “‘sin’ that ‘breeds
like cancer,’” and she wrote, “Why parade your unnatural im8
moral behaviors before the rest of us?” One community member stated, “[i]f these Facebook posts are from Ms. Knox, she
9
should not be teaching our children in public schools.” A municipal judge who was also a former township councilman obtained a copy of the comments and wrote to Knox’s principal
10
requesting that she be suspended. These situations are not
uncommon, due to the popularity of websites like Facebook that
11
encourage users to share their thoughts and opinions. For
most people, the end of the work day marks the end to their
status as an “employee” and a return to their status as an “in12
dividual.” However, teachers must take extra care. Unlike ordinary citizens, teachers at public schools are public employees,
and are subject to a stricter standard when it comes to free
13
speech under the First Amendment.
3. Veteran Teacher Suspended over Facebook Post: Anti-Gay Comments
Spark Outrage, supra note 1, at 6B.
4. Erica Rodriguez, Teacher Back in Class After Being ‘in the Blender’,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 29, 2011, at D1, available at 2011 WLNR 17078814.
5. Winnie Hu, High School Teacher Posts Anti-Gay Entry on Facebook,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2011, at A28.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Jeanette Rundquist, Anti-Gay Rant on Teacher’s Facebook Page Stirs
Firestorm, STAR-LEDGER, Oct. 14, 2011, at 1, available at 2011 WLNR
21081143.
9. Hu, supra note 5, at A28.
10. Rundquist, supra note 8, at 1 (“She has a right to say it. But she does
not have a right to keep her job after saying it.” (quoting John Paragano, a local municipal judge)).
11. See Key Facts, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts (last visited Apr. 02, 2013).
12. Jonathan Turley, Teachers Under the Morality Microscope, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 02, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/02/opinion/la-oe-turley
-teachers-under-scrutiny-20120402.
13. See infra Part I.B.
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Unlike other public employees, teachers who are fired or
merely investigated for their Facebook posts are made famous
14
by news media. Many school districts and states have tried to
15
restrict teachers from using Facebook. In fact, in 2011 Missouri attempted to enact a statute that would prohibit teachers
from using or maintaining an Internet site that would allow
16
contact with students. The unique position that teachers have
within the educational system makes them more visible to the
general public. The current First Amendment standards for
public employees may give teachers a reason to think twice be17
fore speaking on matters of public concern. As Tony Rothert,
the legal director for the ACLU of Eastern Missouri, noted,
“reasonable teachers are going to be afraid to use Facebook or
18
Twitter at all.” These considerations become even more important because of the moral standard that the community ex19
pects teachers to meet.
Litigation about speech on social networking sites has al20
ready begun. Given the high moral standard teachers are held
14. See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 4, at D1.
15. Rachel A. Miller, Note, Teacher Facebook Speech: Protected or Not?,
2011 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 637, 638.
16. See, e.g., S.B. 54, 96th Gen. Assemb., First Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011) (“No
teacher shall establish, maintain, or use a nonwork-related internet site which
allows exclusive access with a current or former student.”); see also Mo. State
Teachers Ass’n v. Missouri, No. 11AC-CC00553, 2011 WL 4425537, at 2 (Mo.
Cir. Sept. 23, 2011) (“[T]he statute . . . would prohibit all teachers from using
any non-work-related social networking sites which allow exclusive access
with current and former students . . . . The Court finds that the statute would
have a chilling effect on speech.”).
17. See, e.g., Lindsay A. Hitz, Note, Protecting Blogging: The Need for an
Actual Disruption Standard in Pickering, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1151, 1189
(2010) (explaining that unpredictable standards would deter individuals from
expressing their thoughts).
18. See Patrik Jonsson, Will Missouri ‘Facebook Law’ Spook Teachers
Away from Social Media?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 3, 2011, available at
2011 WLNR 15369961.
19. See, e.g., Emily H. Fulmer, Note, Privacy Expectations and Protections
for Teachers in the Internet Age, 14 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 28 (2010).
20. See, e.g., Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599, 603–04 (E.D. Va.
2012) (holding that “liking” the page of the sheriff’s election opponent on social
networking website was not constitutionally protected speech). The case has
been appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and Facebook has filed
an amicus brief. Brief for Facebook, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant, Bland v. Roberts, No. 4:11-cv-00045, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599 (4th
Cir. Aug. 6, 2012), available at http://www.delawareemploymentlawblog.com/
Bland%20v.%20Roberts%20Facebook%2C%20Inc.%20Amicus%20Brief.pdf. In
June 2012, a teacher who was fired for her Facebook posts sued the school district, claiming that the school deprived her of her First Amendment rights.
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to, along with modern concerns about privacy and social me21
dia, this situation calls for a re-evaluation of First Amendment speech standards. Currently, teacher social networking
speech receives too little protection. This Note seeks to understand the challenges of regulating social media speech and proposes a new standard for evaluating speech by teachers on so22
cial networking websites such as Facebook. Part I of this Note
provides background information about the use of Facebook
and sets forth the legal framework courts have used to evaluate
First Amendment claims by public employees. Part II analyzes
the shortcomings of the current methods for regulating teacher
Internet speech by discussing how the nature of social networking websites requires a new standard for analyzing teacher
speech. In short, teacher speech on social networking websites
is increasingly vulnerable to restrictions by schools and should
receive greater protection. Part III proposes a refinement of the
Pickering balancing test for evaluating First Amendment
speech claims. This Note argues that as part of the Pickering
test, a school should be required to show evidence of an actual
disruption resulting from teacher speech that occurs on a social
networking site like Facebook.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT INQUIRY: THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
SPEECH
This Part first discusses the controversy surrounding Facebook and explains why teacher conduct on social networking
sites is a matter of public debate. Next, this Part sets forth the
legal framework courts have created to evaluate public employee speech. This Part also discusses the doctrine used to evaluate student speech, as a comparison to the teacher speech analysis. Finally, this Part discusses recent cases that involve
Complaint at 8, Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., No. 2:12-cv-03546 (E.D. Pa.
June 22, 2012); see also Rubino v. City of New York., 950 N.Y.S.2d 494 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2012) (challenging hearing award where teacher was terminated for
Facebook post but not deciding teacher’s First Amendment claim).
21. See Social Networks Getting a Bit Less Social: Poll, REUTERS (Feb. 24,
2012, 1:35 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/24/internet-privacy
-pew-idUSL2E8DO87R20120224.
22. This author refers to Facebook and “Facebook speech” throughout this
Note because Facebook is arguably the most popular social networking site
today, but the problems posed by Facebook speech could apply equally to other
social networking websites with the same features, such as Google Plus or
Twitter.
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teachers who suffered adverse employment actions due to their
speech on the Internet, pointing out the limitations of using the
traditional analysis for social media speech.
A. ISSUES SURROUNDING TEACHER USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA
Teacher use of social media is currently a hot topic in the
news. On one hand, many teachers use social networking websites such as Facebook for personal use and are not likely to
23
stop doing so because of their jobs as teachers. According to a
2011 study of 3000 college students and young professionals,
one in three believes the Internet is “as important as air, water,
24
food, and shelter.” Facebook is similar to a virtual town
square where users log in and connect by posting comments,
25
status updates, and personal opinions. However, unlike a traditional public forum, users have the option of limiting their
profile visibility and controlling who they share information
26
with. On the other hand, others want to regulate teachers’
conduct on social networking sites, desiring to “protect students
from inappropriate contact with teachers that could lead to il27
legal actions” or seeking to keep teachers (and their unpopular opinions) off the Internet.
To further complicate matters, the public holds teachers to
a higher moral standard than other individuals in the commu28
nity. Because of the public education setting where teachers
29
work, speech by teachers is highly scrutinized. Teachers are
expected to exhibit model behavior at all times—as opposed to
23. For an argument that it is unrealistic to expect teachers to give up
their presence on online social networking sites likes Facebook, see for example Fulmer, supra note 19, at 27.
24. CISCO CONNECTED WORLD TECHNOLOGY REPORT, 2011 REPORT,
available at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/netsol/ns1120/index.html#~2011.
25. Obama to Hold Town Hall at Facebook Headquarters, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/04/20/135578893/Obama-to-hold
-town-hall-at-facebook-headquarters (“Facebook is the biggest town square in
the world.”).
26. How to Post & Share, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/
333140160100643/.
27. Miller, supra note 15, at 638.
28. See Fulmer, supra note 19, at 29; see also Helen Norton, Constraining
Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 53 (2009) (explaining that teachers
“face strong public role expectations that they may not escape even when away
from work”).
29. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1058 (17th ed. 2010) (“[P]ublic education is a context in which speech is
highly controlled.”).
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the majority of workers, who have merely “role-specific expecta30
tions” which are limited to their behavior while at work. As a
result, teachers’ use of social networking websites has come
under attack because both students and teachers have access to
the website, which leads to the potential for off-campus student-teacher interaction and the potential for in-class disrup31
tion.
32
Teachers have always had both public and private lives.
Before the advent of social media, students only interacted with
teachers outside of the classroom if they encountered a teacher
33
in public. Now more than ever, students and teachers have an
34
online presence. This online forum makes it more difficult to
35
draw the line between public and private information. Many
schools have considered implementing a social media policy,
36
and some schools have already done so. For most teachers, using Facebook is not problematic because teachers use the web37
site responsibly and keep their private information private.
However, a handful of teachers who post controversial information end up in the principal’s office after parents or commu38
nity members discover and dislike the content. With the advent of new technology like Facebook, schools are struggling to
determine where to draw the line at regulating teacher speech
on websites like Facebook and when they can properly disci39
pline teachers for these activities.
30. Norton, supra note 28, at 53.
31. Alexander Wohl, Oiling the Schoolhouse Gate: After Forty Years of
Tinkering with Teachers’ First Amendment Rights, Time for a New Beginning,
58 AM. U. L. REV. 1285, 1316 (2009).
32. See Miller, supra note 15, at 639.
33. See John Henley, Blurred Boundaries for Teachers, GUARDIAN, (Sept.
22, 2009),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2009/sep/23/teacher-pupil
-sexual-relationship (“Once upon a time, teachers simply did not exist outside
of school.”).
34. Wohl, supra note 31, at 1316 (explaining that sites such as Facebook
are used by both students and teachers and thus provide numerous opportunities for student-teacher communication).
35. Miller, supra note 15, at 652.
36. Gracie Bond Staples, Facing Troubles with Facebook, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Nov. 18, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 23217627 (discussing the use
of social media policies by schools).
37. Amy W. Estrada, Note, Saving Face from Facebook: Arriving at a
Compromise Between Schools’ Concerns with Teacher Social Networking and
Teachers’ First Amendment Rights, 32 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 283, 284 (2010).
38. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 5, at A28.
39. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Social Media, Public School Teachers, and the
First Amendment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1610–16 (2012) (explaining that the
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B. TRADITIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS FOR SPEECH BY PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES
The First Amendment declares that “Congress shall make
40
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” Despite the absolute language in the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has
held that the First Amendment does not prohibit the government from regulating speech, and historically, the First
41
Amendment did not provide much protection for employees.
Until the late twentieth century, government employers had
the same rights as private employers to discipline their employees for their speech; that is, government employers could
discharge or discipline their employees for their speech without
42
limit.
Beginning in the 1960s, the Supreme Court developed a
free speech doctrine for public employees through several key
decisions. In summary of the current standards, when a public
employee makes a claim that his or her speech is protected under the First Amendment, the court will consider whether the
43
employee is making a statement pursuant to official duties. If
the employee is not speaking as a citizen, but as an employee of
44
the government, the speech will not be protected. If the employee is speaking as a citizen, then a court will consider
45
whether the speech is a matter of public concern. If the answer to that question is no, the inquiry will stop there because
46
the speech is not protected. If speech is a matter of public concern, then the court will apply the Pickering balancing test,

current doctrine is ambiguous on schools’ authority to regulate social media
use by teachers); see, e.g., Michael Schwanke, Teachers, Students and the
Blurry Social Media Line, KWCH (May 23, 2012), http://articles.kwch.com/
2012-05-23/math-teacher_31829956 (discussing school social media policies,
noting that they are new territory for schools, thus developing policies is challenging).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
41. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 923–24 (3d ed. 2006).
42. Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of Off-Duty Government Employees, 2010 BYU L. REV. 2117, 2122 (explaining that government
employers “could limit their employees’ speech no matter where the employees
spoke or what they said”).
43. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
44. Id.
45. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
46. Id.
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weighing the interests of the state as an employer and the in47
terests of the employee as a citizen.
Speech is thus protected if it meets all the following elements: it is not made pursuant to official duties, is a matter of
public concern, and the interests of the employee in the speech
48
outweigh the employer’s interests in restricting the speech.
On the other hand, speech is not protected if any of these elements are present: it is made pursuant to official duties, is not
a matter of public concern, or the employer’s interests in restricting the speech outweigh the employee’s interest in speak49
ing. Significantly, these standards only apply to public employees—private employees are left with a lack of protection,
and only covered to the extent protected by statutes such as the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (which protects employees who blow the
whistle on illegal actions) and the National Labor Relations Act
(which protects employees who are engaged in concerted activi50
ty for mutual protection in the workplace).
Pickering v. Board of Education was the first important
decision in the realm of free speech by public employees because it recognized that teachers have First Amendment rights
51
that must be balanced with the state’s interests. In Pickering,
a teacher was fired for sending a letter to a newspaper in which
he criticized the way the school board dealt with allocation of
52
funds and school fundraising. The Supreme Court held that
53
firing the teacher violated the First Amendment. In evaluating the teacher’s speech, the Court held that a balancing test
must be applied, in which the court will balance “the interests
of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
54
through its employees.” The Court listed several factors to
consider when engaging in the balancing test, such as whether
the statements were directed toward a person with whom the
speaker would “normally be in contact in the course of his daily
47.
48.
49.
50.

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572–73 (1969).
See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text.
STEPHEN F. BEFORT & JOHN W. BUDD, INVISIBLE HANDS, INVISIBLE
OBJECTIVES 96–97 (2009).
51. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
52. Id. at 566.
53. See id. at 573–74.
54. Id. at 568.
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55

work”; whether maintaining “discipline by immediate supervisors or harmony among coworkers” would be threatened by
56
the speech; whether working relationships requiring “personal
57
loyalty and confidence” were at issue; and whether the employee’s action “impeded . . . the . . . proper performance of his
daily duties . . . or . . . interfered with the regular operation of
58
the schools generally.” Here, the Court found that the teacher’s speech did not impede the performance of his duties or
59
cause a disruption to the operation of the school. Since teachers were “the members of a community most likely to have informed and definite opinions” on the public issue in question,
the Court viewed the teacher’s comments in the social discourse
60
as a positive influence.
Although Pickering was a victory for public employee
speech rights, the Court soon restricted that right by adding
steps needed to attain the protected speech status. In Connick
v. Myers, the Supreme Court affirmed the use of the Pickering
balancing test, but added a new layer: speech that does not
comment on a matter of public concern is not protected by the
61
First Amendment. The Court has traditionally protected
speech on matters of public concern because of the idea that
speech on matters of public concern, such as politics, are essen62
tial to democratic governance. In contrast, speech on matters
unrelated to the public concern has not been protected. The
Connick case involved a former district attorney who brought
suit contending that she was terminated because she exercised
her right to free speech when she distributed a questionnaire to
55. Id. at 569–70.
56. Id. at 570.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 572–73; Donna Prokop, Note, Controversial Teacher Speech:
Striking a Balance Between First Amendment Rights and Educational Interests, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2533, 2561 (1993) (“Provided that their projections are
reasonable, courts should in some cases allow schools to presume harm to the
effective functioning of the school or the teacher from looking at the statements themselves . . . .”).
59. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572–73.
60. Id. at 572.
61. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (“[I]f Myers’ questionnaire
cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge.”).
62. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (explaining that
there is a “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials”).
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63

her fellow staff members. The questionnaire concerned the
“office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance
committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether
64
employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns.”
The Court held in Connick that while a public employee
does have rights as a citizen, when the employee’s speech as a
citizen addresses a matter of private concern rather than a
matter of “political, social, or other concern to the community,”
65
the employee has no First Amendment protection. Whether
speech addresses a matter of public concern is determined by
considering the “content, form, and context of a given state66
ment.” In Connick, the time and location of the speech were
important, as the Court emphasized the fact that the district
attorney who distributed the questionnaires “exercised her
rights to speech at the office [which] support[ed] . . . fears that
67
the functioning of his office was endangered.” Because of the
location of the speech, there was a more immediate fear about
68
the functionality of the workplace. The Court did not require
an actual disruption, seeing no need for the employer to wait
for disruption to occur at the office and cause “destruction of
69
working relationships.” Connick narrows the circumstances
when the Pickering balancing test will apply, by limiting the
applicability of the balancing test to cases involving employee
70
speech about matters of public concern.
Before a court can consider whether speech is a matter of
public concern and whether to apply the Pickering balancing
test, there is an initial hurdle for the plaintiff. When public
employees “make statements pursuant to their official duties,
the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
71
communications from employer discipline.” As a result, when
an employee speaks pursuant to his official duties, even if the
63. Connick, 461 U.S. at 141.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 146.
66. Id. at 147–48.
67. Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 151–52.
70. Id. at 147; Papandrea, supra note 42, at 2125.
71. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (emphasis added) (holding that a district attorney who wrote a memo recommending dismissal of a
case due to government misconduct was speaking pursuant to official duties,
and was unprotected by the First Amendment).
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speech is on a matter of public concern, the employee has no
72
First Amendment protection. This limit is acceptable because
when a public employer restricts an employee’s speech about
professional duties or responsibilities, the employer “does not
infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a
private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or creat73
ed.”
C. BORROWING FROM STUDENT SPEECH DOCTRINE
As a public employer, schools can regulate employee
74
75
speech. Schools are also permitted to restrict student speech.
An explanation of the student speech doctrine is relevant here,
as some courts have looked to student speech cases for guidance as to what constitutes speech on a matter of public con76
cern. In the landmark case Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District, the Supreme Court held that the
First Amendment protected high school students who wore
black armbands to school in an effort to protest the Vietnam
77
War. Tinker entrenched the rule that “to justify prohibition of
a particular expression of opinion,” the school must show that
the conduct could “materially and substantially interfere with
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of
78
the school.” When dealing with student speech the school does
not need to prove that a substantial disruption has actually occurred, just that the school reasonably believes the speech
79
would substantially disrupt the school or classroom.
Student speech is regulated differently than adult speech.
The Court in Bethel School District No. 43 v. Fraser explained
this difference by comparing student speech with that of ordi-

72. See id.
73. Id. at 421–22.
74. See supra Part I.B.
75. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512–
13 (1969).
76. See, e.g., Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 693 (4th Cir.
2007).
77. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
78. Id. at 509.
79. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The question is
not whether there has been actual disruption, but whether school officials
‘might reasonably portend disruption’ from the student expression at issue.”
(quoting Lavine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001))).
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80

nary adult citizens. The Court held that “the constitutional
rights of students in public school are not automatically coex81
tensive with the rights of adults in other settings.” Even nondisruptive school speech can be restricted if it is lewd, vulgar,
82
or offensive. In Fraser, the offensive speech occurred at a high
school assembly and the Court explained that the school setting
was “no place for a sexually explicit monologue directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students,” so the
83
school did not infringe the student’s speech rights. Significantly, several courts agree that Fraser only applies to on84
campus speech—that is, speech that occurs on school grounds.
Schools have wide-ranging control over student speech
when the speech occurs either at school or pursuant to a school85
sponsored activity. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
involved a challenge to censorship of a high school paper pub86
lished by a journalism class. The Court ruled in favor of the
school and held that a school could exercise control over the
“style and content of student speech” where the speech involves
“school-sponsored expressive activities,” as long as the school’s
restrictions are “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
87
concerns.”
From this line of cases, there have emerged several types
of regulations that schools can use to limit student speech. If
speech is lewd, vulgar, or offensive, schools can prohibit the
speech, and the school does not need to show its potential for
88
disruption. For speech that is not deemed lewd, vulgar, or offensive, the school can restrict it if the school reasonably pre89
dicts a substantial disruption.

80. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 685.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 688 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); J.S. ex rel.
Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 932 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating
that Fraser does not apply to off-campus speech and finding that simply because a student printed the plaintiff’s offensive Facebook profile and brought
it to the school did not transform the off-campus speech into on-campus speech
that the school could punish).
85. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
86. Id. at 263–64.
87. Id. at 273.
88. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682.
89. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
(1969).
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D. PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH ON THE INTERNET
While no cases have been decided that deal with Facebook
posts by teachers, there are several cases involving teachers
who are disciplined, transferred, or terminated for other online
activities. In all of these cases, the teachers lost, and the courts
have declined to extend First Amendment protection to teacher
90
online speech.
One case, Richerson v. Beckon, involved a teacher’s personal blog, where she wrote rude and insulting comments about
91
people she worked with. The teacher filed suit, alleging that
she was transferred to a new position in retaliation for speech
92
on her personal blog. The blog was publicly available and included “several highly personal and vituperative comments
about her employers, union representatives, and fellow teach93
ers.” The appellate court upheld the transfer as appropriate
under the Pickering balancing test and concluded that the
teacher’s speech had the potential to disrupt co-worker relations, erode close working relationships, or interfere with the
94
teacher’s performance of her duties. Significantly, this case
involved speech written outside the workplace, but the speech
directly discussed other coworkers, so the school’s interest in
maintaining an efficient workplace overpowered the teacher’s
95
First Amendment rights.
Several cases have revolved around MySpace, an online social network community where users can create profiles to
96
communicate with “friends” and share photographs. In Snyder
v. Millersville University, a student teacher who was teaching
through a public university teacher program maintained a
97
MySpace webpage. The student teacher informed her students

90. See Richerson v. Beckon, 337 F. App’x 637, 638 (9th Cir. 2009);
Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 297–98 (D. Conn. 2008); Snyder
v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3,
2008).
91. Richerson, 337 F. App’x at 638.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 638–39 (finding based on testimony that Richerson’s blog
demonstrated an “actual injury to the school’s legitimate interests”).
95. See id.
96. Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 297–98 (D. Conn. 2008)
(defining the social networking website MySpace.com).
97. Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *5
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008).
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98

during class that she had a MySpace page. On her MySpace
page, Snyder posted a photograph showing her wearing a pirate hat and holding a plastic cup with the caption “drunken
99
pirate.” The court held that the MySpace posting was not protected by the First Amendment because the posting was not a
matter of public concern, particularly since the plaintiff conced100
ed at trial that her post only dealt with “personal matters.”
As a result, the school was able to discipline the teacher’s
speech by refusing to allow her to complete student teaching at
101
the school.
The speech in Snyder did not meet the threshold test of
public concern because the MySpace page only involved personal matters, yet a different teacher was unsuccessful in protecting his First Amendment rights even when some of his
speech was of public concern. In Spanierman v. Hughes, Jeffrey
Spanierman, a high school teacher, brought suit alleging that
his First Amendment rights were violated when his contract
102
was not renewed and he lost his teaching job. Spanierman
had created a MySpace website and used it to communicate
103
with students about homework and about non-school topics.
Unlike the teacher in Snyder, who merely informed her stu104
dents about her MySpace page, Spanierman actually interacted with his students via MySpace—a notable concern for
105
parents.
A guidance counselor at Spanierman’s school received complaints from students about Spanierman’s MySpace
106
profile. The profile was listed under the username “Mr. Spiderman” and contained many casual conversations with stu107
dents. In addition, Spanierman’s profile included a poem in
108
opposition to the Iraq war. As a result, the court found that
Spanierman’s profile included both personal, unprotected
speech, and protected speech (the war poem, because it dealt
109
with a matter of public, political concern). The issue in this
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *16.
Id. at *11, *16.
Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 297 (D. Conn. 2008).
Id. at 298.
Snyder, 2008 WL 5093140, at *5.
Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 298.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 310–11.
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case was whether the adverse employment action resulted from
110
the protected speech or the unprotected speech. The court decided that the decision not to renew Spanierman’s contract did
not result from the protected speech, but the unprotected
111
speech. Since the teacher presented no evidence that the
school retaliated against him for his political views, the school
was able to fire him without violating his First Amendment
112
rights.
For an employee to succeed on a claim of First Amendment
retaliation, a plaintiff must establish that: “(1) his speech was
constitutionally protected, (2) he suffered an adverse employment decision, and (3) a causal connection exists between his
speech and the adverse employment determination against
him, so that it can be said that his speech was a motivating fac113
tor in the determination.” Even if a plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case, the school can escape liability by demonstrating that it would have taken the adverse action anyway, even
114
without the protected speech. In Spanierman, the teacher did
not show that the war poem was the reason why the school
115
terminated his contract. As a result, his termination was up116
held.
As made evident by recent First Amendment cases involving Internet speech, it is difficult under the current standards
for a teacher to succeed on a First Amendment claim where
117
online speech is at the center of the dispute. In the line of
cases since Pickering, it has become an uphill battle for a
teacher to win on a First Amendment claim due to the high
118
standard for public concern, the causality requirement the
119
teacher must establish, and the possibility that the school
can prove it would have taken the same adverse employment

110. Id. at 311.
111. See id. at 312 (finding that the school would have taken the same adverse action against the teacher even without the protected speech war poem).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 308.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 312.
116. Id. at 313.
117. See Richerson v. Beckon, 337 F. App’x 637, 638 (9th Cir. 2009);
Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 297–98; Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 071660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008).
118. See Papandrea, supra note 42, at 2159–61.
119. See, e.g., Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 308.
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action against the teacher even without the protected speech.
As one scholar explains the evolution of the public employee
speech doctrine,
[P]ublic employees went from having no First Amendment rights to
having hardly any: from the regime described by Justice Holmes, in
which they had a right to speak, but no right to a job, to the regime
recently created by the Supreme Court, in which they have a right to
speak, but no right to be free from employer discipline if they do so as
121
part of their job.

Under the current doctrine, teachers have a right to speak, but
they are currently not free from employer discipline—even if
the speech has nothing to do with the teacher’s work (for example, the speech occurs off-duty and does not actually affect the
school or classroom).
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
SPEECH DOCTRINE AND LIMITATIONS OF PREVIOUSLY
PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES
This Part argues that the traditional public employee
speech doctrine provides too little protection for teacher speech
on online social networking websites by discussing the weaknesses in the traditional Pickering analysis. Next, this Part
evaluates solutions proposed by other commentators who purport to resolve the issues surrounding teacher use of social
networking websites. Although the Pickering balancing test
sets forth a framework for analyzing public employee speech, as
courts have applied this test critics have exposed problems with
the public employee speech doctrine. Most importantly, these
standards create unpredictability and give schools leeway to
discipline and suppress speech that should be protected by the
First Amendment.
A. PROBLEMS WITH THE PICKERING BALANCING TEST
122

The Pickering balancing test results in uncertainty for
public employees because even if the employee is speaking on a
matter of public concern, the balancing of interests between the
employer and the employee can still leave the employee with no
123
remedy. Using a balancing test to decide issues of free speech
120. See, e.g., id.
121. George Rutherglen, Public Employee Speech in Remedial Perspective,
24 J.L. & POL’Y 129, 129 (Spring 2008).
122. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
123. See id.; Papandrea, supra note 42, at 2119 (“[A] public employee’s
speech is not entitled to any First Amendment protection unless it is deter-
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means that a teacher could be speaking on a matter of public
concern and the court could find that the balancing of interests
weighs in favor of the school district. Right now the balance has
124
a strong disposition in favor of the school district. Because
applying a balancing test makes it difficult to know what kind
of speech is protected and when, teachers may be silenced from
125
speaking out about important matters in an online forum.
While these concerns are not unique to teachers, when these
shortcomings are considered in conjunction with the moral expectations the public has for teachers, they require adjusting
the Pickering balancing test to better protect teacher speech.
Because the current standards for First Amendment protection are somewhat vague, there is no exact definition of
126
speech that is protected and speech that is unprotected. As a
result, public employees cannot always predict whether or not
their speech is protected by the First Amendment. Having some
degree of certainty within categories of speech is “critical to the
soundness of any First Amendment doctrine assigning different
127
levels of protection to different categories of speech.” Uncermined, as a threshold matter, that the speech involves a matter of public concern, and, even if that requirement is satisfied, the speech is protected only if
the value of the speech outweighs the government employer’s interests in restricting or punishing it.”).
124. Rutherglen, supra note 121, at 142 (“[T]he Pickering balance was almost always struck in favor of the employer. The employee’s side of the balance, limited to interests in speech on matters of public concern, rarely plays a
decisive role.”); see also Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of
Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1987) (explaining that the public employee speech test results in courts deferring broadly to
the government employer).
125. Rutherglen, supra note 121, at 144 (explaining that when employees
cannot “easily ascertain what speech is protected,” they may be deterred from
speaking at all); Steven J. Stafstrom, Jr., Note, Government Employee, Are
You a “Citizen”?: Garcetti v. Ceballos and the “Citizenship” Prong to the Pickering/Connick Protected Speech Test, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 589, 624–25 (2008)
(explaining that a public employee will have to undertake the same inquiry
that a court does in determining whether speech is protected, and noting that
most employees will have a difficult time making this determination); see also
Andrew C. Alter, Note, Public Employees’ Free Speech Rights: Connick v. Myers Upsets the Delicate Pickering Balance, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
173, 195 (1984) (asserting that the Pickering balancing test does not provide
public employees with adequate First Amendment protection because the balancing test is capricious and provides too easy a burden for the employer).
126. See Rutherglen, supra note 121, at 143 (explaining that while Pickering recognized that public employees had free speech rights, those rights were
not clearly defined).
127. Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of
an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 42 (1990).
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tainty about the level of protection a category of speech will receive can result in mistakenly characterizing speech or sup128
pressing speech that should be protected.
Second, critics have attacked the use of the current public
employee standards to evaluate “non-work-related, off-duty
129
speech.” Scholars have argued that the Pickering balancing
test might not apply when an employee’s speech occurs during
non-work hours and when the employee’s speech has no obvi130
ous connection to his employment. The Supreme Court has
also suggested its support for this argument. For example, the
majority in Connick stated that employee speech which “transpires entirely on the employee’s own time, and in nonwork ar131
eas of the office” could lead to a different conclusion. Taking
this argument further, the dissent in Connick asserted that
when a public employee engages in “expression unrelated to
their employment while away from the work place, their First
Amendment rights are, of course, no different from those of the
132
general public.” Several of the limitations that critics have
noted about the Pickering balancing test are particularly relevant to Internet speech. For example, Facebook (or sites with
similar features) provides a convenient forum for off-duty
speech. In addition, the type of speech an individual expresses
on the Internet is often varied, giving rise to uncertain predictions about whether the speech is protected.

128. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 428 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(“Open speech by a private citizen on a matter of public importance lies at the
heart of expression subject to protection by the First Amendment.”); see
Estlund, supra note 127, at 46.
129. See, e.g., Papandrea, supra note 42, at 2144–59 (discussing confusion
and criticism related to the public concern test); see also D. Gordon Smith,
Comment, Beyond “Public Concern”: New Free Speech Standards for Public
Employees, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 266 (1990) (proposing a threshold test for
public employee speech where the speech must be sufficiently related to employment before the Pickering balancing test will apply to off-duty speech).
130. Papandrea, supra note 42, at 2153; see also Norton, supra note 28, at
54 (stating that the circumstances when the government should be permitted
to control off-duty speech of its workers to protect the government’s own or official expression should be limited to those employees considered “quintessentially public servants”).
131. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 153 n.13 (1983).
132. Id. at 157 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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B. SOCIAL NETWORKING SPEECH IS DIFFERENT FROM
TRADITIONAL SPEECH AND CREATES PROBLEMS WHEN APPLYING
THE TRADITIONAL PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH DOCTRINE
There are problems with applying the traditional public
employee speech doctrine to speech by teachers on social media
sites such as Facebook. This section analyzes the features that
make Internet speech inherently different from speech in traditional forums and explains why these distinctions require a
133
new standard for speech that occurs on Facebook. Speech on
Facebook can occur during non-work hours and users can manage privacy settings to control access. There are uncertainties
about whether or not speech is protected when there are different types of content on one individual’s profile. Due to these
uncertainties, there is a risk of a “chilling effect” that would deter teachers from engaging in expressive activities.
First, a teacher who posts something on Facebook can do so
134
during non-work hours and off of school grounds. Although
there are other types of speech that can occur during a teacher’s non-working hours, such as writing a letter to a newspa135
per, attending a public meeting, or participating in a public
event, Facebook speech is unique because the user can control
136
who has access by setting up privacy filters. When a teacher
participates in a public activity or writes an editorial to a
newspaper, the teacher cannot choose who views the teacher
engaging in such conduct or who reads the editorial. In contrast, Facebook allows for direct communication with a single
137
individual or groups of individuals. The teacher can choose
the size of his or her audience and set limits on who can view
138
Facebook posts. These filters are not foolproof and not all
139
teachers use them. Some teachers may have an entirely public profile while others may only allow personal friends to view
140
their profiles. It is also possible that a person who has access
will share the post with someone who does not have access—
133. As mentioned above, these same problems could exist with other social
networking sites with the same features as Facebook.
134. Miller, supra note 15, at 652.
135. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 566 (1969) (involving a teacher’s letter to the editor in a local newspaper).
136. How to Post & Share, supra note 26.
137. Id.
138. Id. (explaining the audience selector feature).
139. See Estrada, supra note 37, at 284.
140. Id.

2013]

DISRUPTING THE PICKERING BALANCE

1837

which is one reason why teachers should not be punished for
141
speech they intended to keep private.
Compared with a
teacher who writes an editorial in the newspaper and wants to
share his or her opinion with the public, Facebook posts are not
always meant for public eyes. Unlike an editorial, which students may read, a teacher can choose to prevent students from
142
seeing her Facebook page. It creates an absurd result when
schools can punish teachers for sharing their opinions on a topic via Facebook, when overhearing a teacher’s public remark or
observing a teacher at an event for a political cause would like143
ly not raise the same concerns among the public. The current
speech standards may force teachers to the extreme of using
“fake profiles, fake name[s] . . . and a cloud of other minor lies
144
to keep their profiles safe.”
All of the public employee free speech cases heard by the
Supreme Court involved on-the-job speech at work, off-hours
speech that was discussed at work, or speech in publicly acces145
sible mediums such as a newspaper. In earlier eras, “teachers
might have commented in person to each other, their friends, or
neighbors . . . and because those conversations remained pri146
vate, teachers did not suffer adverse employment actions.”
While things posted on Facebook or other social media may
wind up on the “metaphorical front page of the New York
147
Times,” most do not. Many of a teacher’s comments or posts
on Facebook may qualify as a matter of public concern, but are
141. See id. at 287 (suggesting that teachers must worry about the public
gaining access to a private Facebook profile through other users or even hackers).
142. See How to Post & Share, supra note 26.
143. See John Pierce, Wisconsin Teacher Fired for Facebook Firearm Picture, MONACHUS LEX (Feb. 10, 2009), http://monachuslex.com/?p=357 (arguing
that teachers should not be disciplined for displaying photos of themselves engaging in legal behavior).
144. See James Grimmelmann, Privacy as Product Safety, 19 WIDENER L.
J. 793, 799–800 (2010) (discussing Facebook privacy and referring in this instance to children who hide their Facebook profiles from their parents).
145. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141–46 (1983) (involving a
questionnaire distributed to staff members at the office); Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968) (involving an employee letter to a local newspaper). See generally Joseph O. Oluwole, Eras in Public Employment—Free
Speech Jurisprudence, 32 VT. L. REV. 317 (2007) (discussing the Court’s free
speech jurisprudence).
146. Miller, supra note 15, at 652.
147. Grimmelmann, supra note 144, at 804–05 (explaining that Facebook
facilitates conversation between small groups, social contexts not intended for
outsiders or the full public, and boundaried spaces).
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only shared with one or two people, much like a direct conversation. When posting to Facebook, it is more likely that a
teacher is acting as an ordinary citizen. The Supreme Court
has held that the First Amendment protects the “private ex148
pression of one’s views” from retaliation in employment. Yet
courts have not considered applying this standard to social media speech, even though some social media speech is more private than public, due to privacy filters and posts during non149
work hours. This factor presents a strong case for placing the
weight on the teacher’s side of the scale when the court balances the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, with the interests of
150
the school as an employer. One of the fundamental principles
that permits speech restrictions is the idea that public employers need to maintain an efficient operation of government offic151
es. Yet speech that occurs in private, outside of work, and
which is unrelated to the job the teacher does in the classroom
is not relevant to efficient operations or a well-functioning
152
school. As Justice Brennan argues in his dissent in Connick,
the school’s interest in restricting speech as an employer should
not come into play when employees engage in expression that is
unrelated to their employment and engaged in outside of work.
Second, when a teacher posts something on Facebook, the
page will likely contain numerous postings, some of which may
153
be personal and some of which may relate to a public concern.
148. Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 412–14 (1979)
(holding that statements made in private conversation between plaintiff and
the school principal could support claim of unconstitutional employment action).
149. See Grimmelmann, supra note 144, at 804 (“Although it may be wise
to remember that anything posted to the site could become public knowledge,
it does not follow that full and open publicity is natural, desirable, or inevitable.”); Ken Strutin, Social Media and the Vanishing Points of Ethical and Constitutional Boundaries, 31 PACE L. REV. 228, 246–47 (2011) (“Social media is
different from traditional mail, electronic mail, telephone calls, and
telefacsimiles” and to answer whether content was meant to be private, the
“terms of service, user expectations, webware, and current practices must all
be examined.”).
150. Seog Hun Jo, The Legal Standard on the Scope of Teachers’ Free
Speech Rights in the School Setting, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 413, 417–19 (2002) (opining that when a teacher speaks as a citizen, the school’s interests in limiting
the teacher’s speech should be no different than when any other citizen
speaks).
151. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151–52 (1983) (emphasizing the need
for an efficient operation of the district attorney’s office and focusing on the
fact that the speech occurred in the workplace).
152. See id. at 157 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
153. Estrada, supra note 37, at 307.
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As a result, a teacher’s Facebook profile likely includes speech
that is protected under the First Amendment and speech that
154
is likely not entitled to protection. In comparison, when an
individual writes an editorial to the newspaper or stands up to
speak at a public meeting, it is easier to determine if those
155
comments, as a whole, are public concern. Just because a
teacher speaks on both protected and unprotected matters does
not mean that the teacher’s speech should receive more defer156
ence; a court can analyze both types of speech separately.
However, when a teacher has several types of speech on her
Facebook page, there is more uncertainty about which speech is
protected and which speech is the reason for the school’s discipline. In theory, a teacher can be fired for protected speech, but
as long as the school can use the teacher’s unprotected speech
to provide a legitimate reason for termination, the school can
157
prevail in a subsequent lawsuit. This “same-decision-anyway
defense” could encourage schools to fabricate reasons for disciplining teachers based on unprotected speech when in reality
158
schools are disciplining teachers based on protected speech.
While a teacher can be fired for unprotected speech on
matters of private concern, a teacher who is concerned about
the ramifications of online speech may be less likely to engage
154. See Paul Forster, Teaching in a Democracy: Why the Garcetti Rule
Should Apply to Teaching in Public Schools, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 687, 712–13
(2010–2011) (noting that a teacher’s Facebook page will likely include speech
on a matter of public concern and other speech on private matters).
155. See Massaro, supra note 124, at 24 (“Examples of fairly clear cases of
free speech violations might be terminating a public worker for complaints
made at a public meeting or in the local newspaper about race discrimination . . . . ”).
156. Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 310–12 (D. Conn. 2008)
(finding that except for a war poem, the majority of plaintiff’s MySpace page
was not of public concern and explaining that the plaintiff would need to prove
a causal relationship between the protected speech and the adverse employment action by showing that he was fired for his protected speech).
157. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
274, 287 (1977); see also Anthony N. Moshirnia, The Pickering Paper Shield:
The Erosion of Public School Teachers’ First Amendment Rights Jeopardizes
the Quality of Public Education, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 313, 324 (2007) (“If the
plaintiff proves only that the conduct was a contributory cause, the government may nonetheless prevail. This may mean that, in practice, only plaintiffs
with extraordinarily strong evidence of a causal connection between their
speech and the government’s retaliatory decision will file suit to vindicate
their First Amendment rights.”).
158. Oluwole, supra note 145, at 335–36; Alter, supra note 125, at 195 (explaining that relying on the employer’s view that an employee’s actions could
disrupt the workplace gives too much freedom to the employer).
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159

in speech at all. By doing so, the teacher might avoid unprotected speech but also refrain from engaging in important
speech regarding matters of public concern that would be protected. Matters of public concern are more likely to be consid160
ered controversial or unpopular viewpoints. These are the
161
types of speech that the First Amendment should protect.
However, because teachers are held to a higher moral standard,
members of the public who disagree with a statement that is
controversial are most likely to complain to the school district,
and the school might restrict speech that would not even affect
its operations. Just as the Internet and social networking sites
have “made it easier for school administrators to find objection162
able student speech and punish it,” these sites have made it
easier for school districts to find what they consider objectionable teacher speech and punish it. As a result, a teacher might
be less willing to engage in what could be protected speech under the First Amendment, due to concerns about being subject
to discipline by the school district or fears of complaints from
163
parents who somehow gain access to the speech. Teachers’
159. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972) (stating that persons
whose expression is protected “may well refrain from exercising their rights”
for fear of punishment); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967)
(discussing the danger of the chilling effect on teachers’ exercise of First
Amendment rights that arises when it is uncertain what speech is protected);
Zachary Martin, Public School Teachers’ First Amendment Rights: In Danger
in the Wake of “Bong Hits 4 Jesus”, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 1183, 1184 (2008)
(stating that if teachers feel their speech is constantly monitored, they may
ultimately chill their speech); Rutherglen, supra note 121, at 144 (discussing
the potential for chilling of speech); see also Jonsson, supra note 18.
160. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387–88 (1987) (holding that a
public employee’s statement expressing her desire that the next assassination
attempt on President Reagan would be successful touched on a matter of public concern, and concluding that the “inappropriate or controversial character
of a statement is irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a matter of
public concern”); see also D. Duff McKee, Termination or Demotion of a Public
Employee in Retaliation for Speaking out as a Violation of Right of Free
Speech, 22 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 203, 227 (1993) (“The subject matter
of speech that has been held to qualify as matters of public concern can be categorized into three general classifications: (1) controversial speech on matters
of current public debate, (2) criticism of the agency or its administrators, and
(3) whistleblowing.”).
161. Estlund, supra note 127, at 13 (explaining that the Supreme Court
has a history of protecting speech on “public issues” and “public affairs”).
162. Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae and Brief for the Alliance Defense Fund and Liberty Institute as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012) (No. 11-461),
2011 WL 5548730, at *11.
163. See Moshirnia, supra note 157, at 332 (arguing that the current lack
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fears about discipline for their online activities, coupled with
their knowledge that their speech will receive little protection,
is likely to cause teachers to self-censor and refrain from engag164
ing in speech on important societal concerns. These differences require refining the current public employee speech doctrine for online speech by teachers.
Underlying the concerns with social media speech is the
way new technology affects old standards for constitutional
protections. While the privacy of social networking “has not yet
been clearly assigned a specific level of First, Fourth, or Fifth
Amendment protections,” courts have reconsidered longstanding precedent because of new technologies, whether to increase
165
protections or adjust standards. Courts have differentiated a
166
GPS tracking device from earlier devices such as beepers,
have applied a new sliding scale for personal jurisdiction based
167
on an entity’s presence on the Internet, the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) has extended the National Labor Relations Act protections to social media by striking down em168
ployer policies on social media use, states have enacted legislation that prohibits requesting or requiring an employee or
applicant to disclose their user name or password for personal
169
social media accounts,
and most significantly, a growing
of First Amendment protections for teachers could result in a “‘chill’ on public
educators’ exercise of their First Amendment rights” and could have a “terrible
impact on the quality of public education” by influencing teachers wary of the
risk of losing their jobs from exercising their First Amendment rights to select
careers in the private sector).
164. See, e.g., Rosalie Berger Levinson, Superimposing Title VII's Adverse
Action Requirement on First Amendment Retaliation Claims: A Chilling Prospect for Government Employee Speech, 79 TUL. L. REV. 669, 685 (2005) (stating that the potential loss of employment in retaliation for speech may chill
speech on matters of public concern); Lawrence Rosenthal, Permissible Content Discrimination Under the First Amendment: The Strange Case of the Public Employee, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 529, 558 (1998) (“Even an employee
who wishes to speak out on matters of public concern in a non-disruptive
manner will pause if she is not sure whether it will cost her her job.”).
165. See Strutin, supra note 149, at 242.
166. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012).
167. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1126–27
(W.D. Pa. 1997).
168. MICHAEL J. EASTMAN, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, A SURVEY OF
SOCIAL MEDIA ISSUES BEFORE THE NLRB 1 (2011), available at http://www
.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/NLRB%20Social%20Media%
20Survey.pdf (noting that the NLRB reviewed more than 100 complaints related to social media speech).
169. For a summary of state legislation on this issue, see Employer Access
to Social Media Usernames and Passwords, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES
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number of courts have held that Internet speech by students often cannot be regulated by schools so long as it takes place off
170
campus, unless it creates an on-campus disruption.
C. PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED SOLUTIONS WOULD NOT BE AS
EFFECTIVE AS AN ACTUAL DISRUPTION STANDARD
Commentators have proposed various solutions to the problem of regulating online teacher speech. This section discusses
the shortcomings of various solutions to the problem of teacher
speech on Facebook. There are two popular solutions for regulating online teacher speech: first, apply the framework that is
171
used for analyzing student speech to analyze teacher speech;
second, retain the Pickering framework but regulate speech or
use of Facebook or other social networking sites through legis172
lative action. Ultimately, neither of these two options is a sufficient framework for protecting teacher speech while maintaining consideration for a school’s need to operate effectively.

(Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/employer-access-to
-social-media-passwords.aspx.
170. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205,
219 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that the school district violated the high school
student’s First Amendment rights by suspending him for creating a fake Internet profile of the school principal on Facebook that he created during nonschool hours and at home, explaining the school could not punish the out of
school expressive conduct based on the circumstances, and declined to define
precise parameters for when schools can discipline off-campus speech); Evans
v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (holding that the creation of a group on Facebook expressing dislike for a teacher was off-campus
speech, and was protected where the student created the group off campus,
creation did not occur at school sponsored activity, and the group was not accessed at school); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D.
Wash. 2000) (granting a motion for a temporary restraining order prohibiting
the school from suspending a student for creating a web page from his home
because the student had a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim that
the school violated his First Amendment rights); see also Porter v. Ascension
Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 619 (5th Cir. 2004) (declining to apply the traditional Tinker standard to a student who drew an offensive photo at home
and kept it there because Tinker only applies to student expression that “occur[s] on the school premises”).
171. E.g., Miller, supra note 15, at 663–64 (proposing that the student
speech doctrine should apply to teacher Internet speech).
172. Estrada, supra note 37, at 303 (proposing a state statute to address
the problems of teacher social networking); Fulmer, supra note 19, at 65–69
(proposing state legislation or, alternatively, that courts address the problem
of Internet speech by public educators).
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1. School Speech Doctrine
Some commentators propose that the framework for regulating student speech should provide the standard for evaluat173
ing teacher speech.
Applying the student-speech doctrine
would consider whether speech is lewd, offensive, or vulgar;
and if not, the doctrine would ask whether the speech would
174
potentially disrupt the functioning of the school. There are
significant flaws in applying the student speech protections to
teacher speech. Student speech caselaw has evolved separately
from teacher speech with a distinct doctrine. Because the concerns with student speech are different from those underlying
speech by teachers, applying the student speech standards to
teachers could be overly protective of speech. Finally, before
stripping away longstanding caselaw and precedent on the
First Amendment, it is more practical to consider adjusting the
current standards as a solution.
One reason why the student speech cases should not apply
to teacher speech is because cases involving student speech
175
were never meant to address teacher speech.
Speech by
adults has always been treated differently than speech by chil176
dren. In addition, Tinker was not meant to apply to all offcampus speech, as recently discussed by the Third Circuit: “[I]f
Tinker were applied to off-campus speech, there would be little
reason to prevent school officials from regulating adult speech
uttered in the community. Adults often say things that give rise
to disruptions in public schools . . . [T]he prospect of using
177
Tinker to silence such speakers is absurd.” The Third Circuit
implied that if Tinker applied to off-campus speech, it would
regulate not just teachers and students, but non-public employ173. E.g., Karen C. Daly, Balancing Act: Teachers’ Classroom Speech and
the First Amendment, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 41 (2001) (discussing the rationale
that teachers should have the same rights to free speech as do students); Miller, supra note 15, at 663–64 (proposing that the student speech doctrine
should apply to teacher Internet speech, provided that teachers and students
are not friends on Facebook and that students should not have access to a
teacher’s profile or website).
174. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
(1969); see Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688 n.1 (1986)
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
175. Wohl, supra note 31, at 1309–10.
176. Id. at 1310 (“While there are numerous overlapping interests and applications between teachers and students, applying one analysis to both is like
trying to fit a square peg into a round hole.”).
177. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 (3d
Cir. 2011).
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ees as well. This would result in an overly broad First Amendment restriction, effectively restricting any speech by any indi178
vidual that could result in a school disruption. Considering
that the problematic speech by teachers frequently originates
off-campus, applying standards for student speech that do not
apply to off-campus speech would not be an effective solution.
Regulating teacher speech in the same way as student
speech would overly protect teacher speech in that it would protect the wrong kinds of speech—speech that could harm the educative purpose of the school. Applying the student speech
framework, it is possible that a teacher’s Facebook postings on
matters of political or social concern would be protected, but so
might teacher criticism of the school, criticism of students, or
179
posting photos that could be deemed inappropriate. This type
of content that would be protected under the student-speech
test would likely be unprotected under the teacher-speech doctrine because it would probably not qualify as a public con180
cern. Allowing teachers to be free from adverse action for
posts that criticize the school or specific students is not the type
of speech that needs greater protection, because protecting it
181
does not serve the interests underlying the First Amendment.
Applying the student speech framework to teacher online
speech would strip away years of public employee speech precedent because it would entirely disregard the public concern
182
test and the Pickering balancing test. Simply applying the
student speech doctrine overlooks the roles teachers have as
educators who are in a position to influence and shape their
183
students’ minds. It would also ignore the fact that teachers
are employees who must function with others in the workplace.
As a result of a teacher’s role as public employee and educator,
courts can justify controlling teacher speech under different

178. See id.
179. Miller, supra note 15, at 657; see also Papandrea, supra note 39 at
1634–35 (suggesting that courts should discard the public concern requirement).
180. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146–47 (1983).
181. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 29, at 763 (discussing historical
reasons why free speech has been protected, such as advancing knowledge and
truth, facilitating democracy and self-government, and “promoting individual
autonomy, self-expression and self-fulfillment”).
182. Miller, supra note 15, at 660–64.
183. Fulmer, supra note 19, at 27 (“Teachers are in a position to influence
their students’ behavior.”).
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standards than those used to control student speech. The
student speech doctrine primarily considers the potential disruption to the classroom, which is an important factor. However, since schools are both educators and employers, the employer’s interest in an efficient and functional workplace also needs
to be part of the analysis.
Additionally, applying the student speech doctrine to
teacher speech would place teachers in a different category
than other public employees, who would remain bound by the
Pickering analysis. While teachers work in a position that carries distinct concerns, there is not a good reason to depart from
the entire public employee speech doctrine when regulating
teacher speech. For example, a teacher’s speech that occurs in
class or is pursuant to official duties should still be regulated
185
according to the employee speech doctrine. A better approach
to dealing with the problems with the Pickering balancing test
and public employee speech doctrine is not to disregard the doctrine itself, but to make adjustments to the standard it provides. The distinct issues with social networking websites can
be addressed by refining the Pickering standard for those instances, instead of applying an entirely different framework.
2. Legislative Solutions
Many commentators who propose changing the Pickering
standard also suggest some type of statutory prohibition on
186
teacher social networking use. However, when application of
a First Amendment standard is contingent upon restricting
student-teacher interactions on social media, the solution is not
ideal. Prohibiting teacher-student interaction is problematic
because speech on social networking websites can trigger the
First Amendment freedom of speech along with the freedom of

184. Daly, supra note 173, at 13 (arguing that subjecting teachers and students to an identical standard for free speech is unjustifiable and flawed).
185. For a discussion of whether the Pickering and Garcetti framework for
analyzing public employee speech should apply to the in-class speech of teachers, see generally Neal H. Hutchens, Silence at the Schoolhouse Gate: The Diminishing First Amendment Rights of Public School Employees, 97 KY. L.J. 37
(2008).
186. Estrada, supra note 37, at 303 (proposing a state statute that punishes irresponsible use of a social networking site, with provisions that define irresponsible use); Fulmer, supra note 19, at 29 (proposing that state legislation
would be an effective way of protecting a public educator’s free speech on social networking websites or, alternatively, suggesting that courts could address the problem of protecting Internet speech by public educators).
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187

association. Resolving the First Amendment issue by restricting association only shifts the problem to a different constitutional right.
Although waiting for courts to reevaluate the First
Amendment as it applies to new technology may not be an immediate solution, allowing each state to legislatively create
First Amendment standards is not an efficient solution. Since
each state would need to enact legislation individually, state
legislation may not be consistent from state to state, and some
188
states may impose stricter standards than others. In addition, because teachers are often held to a higher moral standard by the public (at least compared with other public employees), it is likely that legislators could be hesitant to increase
speech protections for teachers. On the contrary, legislators
189
might tend to restrict speech rather than protect it. What
teachers need is one clear and consistent approach to social
networking websites. Given the importance of this issue, it
should be decided by courts, not state legislatures.
Another possibility is for Congress to take action by enacting a federal statute addressing the unpredictability of the
190
Pickering balancing test. For example, writing about personal
blogs, one author proposes a federal statute that would prohibit
a federal government employer from discharging an employee
or taking other adverse action because of an “individual’s offduty electronic communications” unless the employer “demonstrates a showing of actual disruption to the workplace caused
191
by the off-duty electronic communications.” This solution has
promise, but would only be able to protect federal employees,
192
instead of all public employees —meaning that it would provide little relief for teachers, who are not usually federal employees. As the author explains, it would be very unlikely that a
federal statute applying an actual disruption standard to states
193
would be upheld under the Fourteenth Amendment. Since a
federal statute could only address federal employees, teachers
would likely not be protected by such a statute.
187. Estrada, supra note 37, at 297.
188. Fulmer, supra note 19, at 29 (noting several limitations to state legislation, but ultimately deciding in favor of using state legislation).
189. See, e.g., S.B. 54, 96th Gen. Assemb., First Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011).
190. Hitz, supra note 17, at 1193–95.
191. Id. at 1195.
192. See id.
193. Id. at 1193–94 n.220.
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While adopting the standard used to evaluate student
speech or enacting legislation are both options for regulating
public employee speech, they are not the best options. The most
efficient and ideal standard is for courts to give schools a greater burden to meet under the current Pickering balancing test
by imposing a showing of actual disruption requirement.
III. SOLVING THE FACEBOOK DILEMMA: SOLUTIONS TO
PROTECT STUDENTS, AND PRESERVE TEACHERS’
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
This Part argues that an actual disruption standard should
be a required component of the Pickering balancing test once a
court has determined that the speech in question addresses a
matter of public concern. Because Pickering leaves open the element of a balancing test, courts can continue to follow Pickering but can apply it in a different way. This solution better protects teacher speech without the need to overrule Pickering or
its progeny. This Part sets forth a proposed solution that balances teachers’ First Amendment rights with schools’ educational concerns.
A. AN ACTUAL DISRUPTION STANDARD SHOULD APPLY TO
FACEBOOK SPEECH BY TEACHERS
Facebook speech can easily include protected speech (comments about gay rights, presidential elections, or politics) and
unprotected speech (personal information that is not relevant
to the general public, such as music taste). The protected nature of speech is less certain when posted on a personal Facebook page, and speech is often posted from the privacy of one’s
home; therefore schools should have to satisfy a higher standard in order to take adverse action against a teacher. A stricter
standard for schools will provide more certainty for teachers to
predict in advance whether or not their speech could be protected, and will better serve to protect the First Amendment interest in robust public debate. In turn, refining the Pickering
balancing test will also provide more certainty to school districts and administrators regarding when it is appropriate to
discipline and manage employees (and when doing so might be
194
eroding employees’ free speech rights).
194. See Rutherglen, supra note 121, at 144 (describing the benefits of added certainty for employees and employers if the Pickering balancing test was
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When speech meets the standard for public concern, an actual disruption standard should be a required element of the
Pickering balancing test when applied to teachers’ speech
online. An actual disruption standard would mean that, as a
court weighs the teacher’s interest in freedom of speech with
the school’s interest as an employer, a school would need to allege that an actual disruption occurred as a result of the teach195
er’s speech.
1. An Actual Disruption Standard Provides Much Needed
Protection for Teacher Speech
By retaining the Pickering framework for evaluating
teacher speech, a teacher’s post on Facebook must meet the
public concern test before a court will consider a balancing of
196
interests. The public concern test is narrowly construed and
will likely exclude most types of inappropriate speech that
schools dislike such as inappropriate or scandalous photos, insults about particular students or coworkers, and flirtatious
197
contact with students. Once a teacher passes the threshold
element of speech on a matter of public concern, the teacher
has already established that the speech is not frivolous, but
198
serves an important purpose or interest to society. Once the
speech in question meets the public concern threshold, it
should be entitled to a presumption of protection. Then, the
school can rebut this presumption with a showing of an actual
199
disruption.

more structured).
195. See Birdwell v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 491 F.2d 490, 494 (8th Cir.
1974) (summarizing teacher’s arguments that there must be an actual disruption before the school could take adverse action against the teacher).
196. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570 (1968).
197. See Patricia M. Nidiffer, Comment, Tinkering with Restrictions on
Educator Speech: Can School Boards Restrict What Educators Say on Social
Networking Sites?, 36 U. DAYTON L. REV. 115, 141 (2010) (explaining that protecting only speech that relates to a matter of public concern eliminates a majority of speech on social networking sites).
198. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (explaining that speech is
a matter of public concern when it relates to “any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community”).
199. This is much like the standard for employment discrimination claims,
which requires an employee to show prima facie evidence of discrimination,
allows the employer to rebut the claim with proof of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, and permits the employee to present evidence that the employer’s reason is merely pretext for a discriminatory motive. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973).
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The nature of Facebook speech makes it more susceptible
to over-regulation when a school district dislikes the viewpoint
of the protected speech or the unprotected speech that exists
alongside the protected speech. This is more likely when one
considers the high moral standard the public expects of teach200
ers at all times. These high expectations may cause a school
district or concerned parent to be more likely to decide that a
disruption is foreseeable when a disruption is not really immi201
nent. A school could quickly discover a teacher’s Facebook
speech, and just as quickly terminate the teacher, unless an ac202
tual disruption standard is required. Because of the defenses
available to the school district, even where an employee engages in protected speech, the school is still justified in taking adverse action against that employee where it can point to legiti203
mate reasons for termination, such as unprotected speech. It
is not unlikely that a school district could allege facts that suggest the termination is for unprotected speech (which is likely
to exist on someone’s Facebook page), when the reason is simp204
ly pretext for disliking the protected speech. As one scholar
explains, using the mere “substantial disruption” test, which is
the current standard only serves to “constitutionalize the heckler’s veto” and makes unpopular speech (which warrants great205
er protection) most vulnerable to attack. Without an actual
disruption standard, all speech can be theoretically disruptive,
and thus potentially punishable.

200. Norton, supra note 28, at 53 (explaining that teachers “face strong
public role expectations that they may not escape even when away from
work”); Fulmer, supra note 19, at 69 (“[B]ecause of their interaction with parents and students, public school teachers are singled out from among public
employees and held to arbitrary standards of conduct”).
201. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 166 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court
misapplies the Pickering test and holds—against our previous authorities—
that a public employer’s mere apprehension that speech will be disruptive justifies suppression of that speech when all the objective evidence suggests that
those fears are essentially unfounded.”).
202. See Hitz, supra note 17, at 1162–63 (explaining that one public employee was dismissed almost simultaneous to the discovery of her blog so it
was highly unlikely that any actual disruption would have occurred before her
dismissal).
203. Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 313 (D. Conn. 2008).
204. See Hitz, supra note 17, at 1196 (explaining that the “off-duty public
employee blog is particularly susceptible to manipulation in the context of the
Pickering balancing test”).
205. Paul M. Secunda, Blogging While (Publicly) Employed: Some First
Amendment Implications, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 679, 691 (2009).
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2. An Actual Disruption Standard Is Appropriate Considering
the Practical Realities of Disruptive Speech
Opponents may argue that schools should not have to wait
until an actual disruption occurs before doing something about
206
the speech. However, there are practical realities that negate
this argument. First, most of these teacher posts are often
brought to the school’s attention by parents or outsiders, not
207
students. The disruption is not occurring in the classroom but
in the principal’s office, as parents or other community members make complaints about teachers. A disruption in the community due to concern by outsiders is not the same as a disruption that affects the functioning of the classroom or the
208
functioning of the workplace. Because the reaction of the public and the media can adversely affect the outcome of a free
speech case under Pickering, coupled with the high moral
standard for teachers, there is a real concern about unfairly
predicting disruption when speech is unpopular with the com209
munity. If teachers are to feel comfortable speaking online
about matters of public concern, teachers need certainty in the
standards a court will consider before they take the risk of engaging in speech that might represent an unpopular view210
point. Second, any disruption that does occur due to a teach206. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 152 (“[W]e do not see the necessity for an
employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking action. We caution that a stronger showing may be necessary if the employee’s
speech more substantially involved matters of public concern.”).
207. See Rundquist, supra note 8; see also Papandrea, supra note 42, at
2165 (explaining that if there is an adverse public reaction to the employee’s
speech, the employee is likely to lose constitutional protection for his speech,
but if the public does not learn about the employee’s speech or “does not react
strongly to the employee’s speech, then the employee has a stronger chance of
winning”).
208. See generally J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d
915 (3d Cir. 2011) (Smith, J., concurring) (discussing the differences between
off-campus and on-campus speech).
209. See Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99
NW. U. L. REV. 1007, 1018 (2005) (explaining that sources of disruption depend
on the “perceived political or social reprehensibility” of the speech and that
statements which are less socially reprehensible tend to result in less public
outcry and will more likely receive First Amendment protection, compared
with speech that is considered repulsive—which will create more outcry and
receive less protection); Papandrea, supra note 42, at 2165.
210. See Hitz, supra note 17, at 1190–96 (“Balancing tests, by their very
nature, come with a level of uncertainty in application. Although this uncertainty is, in ways, viewed positively for providing flexible application of legal
rules to specific facts, it is important to maintain firm guidelines within the
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er’s online speech is likely to occur sooner rather than later. Incidents that create a disruption within a school community or a
workplace are probably events that happen quickly. A school
might not discover a teacher’s Facebook post until the disruption has already occurred. As New Jersey Board of Education
President Theodore Best explained, a teacher was suspended
“because the incident created serious problems at the school
211
that impeded the functioning of the building.” These practical
realities about speech likely to cause disruption make the “potential for disruption” standard meaningless. An actual disruption standard is a better alternative.
The standard for disruption should require actual proof of
disruptive events that occur at school and disrupt the classroom or the operation of the school. The standard for a disruption could be satisfied by a high volume of student complaints
or actual incidents that take place at the school, between
teachers and students or between teachers and other staff. The
court should look carefully at the complaints or incidents to
make sure that they are genuine. The decisions in earlier Internet speech cases do not preclude applying an actual disrup212
tion test. For example, in Spanierman, the teacher’s speech
was at issue because he corresponded with students and stu213
dents brought complaints to the school. Once a student has
made a complaint about a teacher’s online posts or interactions,
this could satisfy the actual disruption standard.
To avoid a chilling effect that silences teachers from speaking on issues of public concern, an actual disruption test should
214
apply to the public employee speech doctrine. An actual distests in order to ensure that rights—particularly constitutional rights—are
adequately protected.”).
211. 1st-Grade Teacher Suspended for ‘Derogatory’ Facebook Posts About
Her Students, supra note 2 (emphasis added). Best added, “[y]ou can’t simply
fire someone for what they have on a Facebook page, also stated if that spills
over and affects the classroom, then you can take action.” Id. (emphasis added).
212. See, e.g., Alter, supra note 125, at 184 (noting that the majority of public employee dismissal cases involve speech “causing some degree of disruption”).
213. Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 297–98 (D. Conn. 2008).
214. Hitz, supra note 17, at 1154 (explaining that an actual disruption
standard within the Pickering balance test would prevent unnecessary chilling
of a valuable form of speech); Rebecca L. Zeidel, Note, Forecasting Disruption,
Forfeiting Speech: Restrictions on Student Speech in Extracurricular Activities,
53 B.C. L. REV. 303, 335 (2012) (arguing that applying a “forecast of disruption” standard to student speech in extracurricular activities would create a
chilling effect on speech because “it provides unclear or no notice of what
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ruption standard would allow certainty, predictability, prevent
overly hasty or broad decisions by school districts, and most
importantly, encourage teachers to engage in speech about
matters of public concern.
B. COURTS SHOULD ADOPT AN ACTUAL DISRUPTION STANDARD
The judiciary is in the best position to adopt this standard.
Due to the weaknesses discussed in Part II.C.2, state or federal
legislation would be ineffective. Courts should adopt a clear
standard requiring actual disruption as a component of the
Pickering balancing test when off-duty social networking
speech is at issue. This new standard will allow courts to apply
215
the Pickering standard consistently and uniformly. Since the
potential for disruption is already one of several factors to be
considered, creating a higher threshold standard to show actual
disruption will enable teachers to receive adequate First
Amendment protection without changing the entire framework
for public employee speech. Federal courts are in the best position to apply this standard as an interpretation of Pickering,
until the Supreme Court addresses the issue. Although no cases are currently pending before the Supreme Court, it is possible that the Supreme Court may hear the issue at some point in
216
the near future.
Courts are likely to adopt this standard. As the Supreme
Court itself forecasted in Connick, a different result was a possibility if the speech transpired on the employee’s own time and
217
outside of work. This kind of fact pattern has increasingly
emerged, and this proposed solution takes account of those new
facts.

speech may be restricted”).
215. Hitz, supra note 17, at 1191.
216. Nidiffer, supra note 197, at 140 (suggesting that cases such as
Spanierman and Synder indicate that the Supreme Court may soon decide a
case involving teacher social networking speech). Just recently, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari to review Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658
F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2011), a case involving a San Diego teacher who was ordered to remove religious banners from his classroom walls. This case does not
foreclose the possibility that the Court will hear a teacher speech case involving speech outside the classroom and suggests that teacher speech is a significant issue that will not disappear. See Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist.,
No. 11-910, 2012 WL 296110, at *1 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2012) (denying petition for
writ of certiorari).
217. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 153 n.13 (1983).
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CONCLUSION
Engaging in speech on Facebook has led teachers to be investigated, suspended, and even fired. The nature of online
speech on social networking websites like Facebook presents
novel concerns in First Amendment law. As schools and states
seek to regulate employee speech, particularly teacher speech,
this is an area of the law that needs to be addressed. The
standard for determining whether speech will be protected under the First Amendment is unclear, and even more ambiguous
when applied to Facebook speech. Teachers need consistency
and certainty if they are to freely engage in speech that addresses matters of public concern. In order to avoid a chilling
effect on teacher speech, the Pickering standard must be reconsidered. By retaining the public concern inquiry, and mandating that an actual disruption is necessary to take action against
Internet speech, both teachers’ interests and schools’ interests
will be adequately balanced.

